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Abstract
The international community recently agreed on a mechanism called REDD+ to reduce
deforestation in tropical countries. However the mechanism, by its very nature, has no
reason to induce a Pareto optimal reduction of deforestation. The aim of this article is to
proposeanalternativeclassofmechanismsfornegativeexternalitiesthatimplementsPareto 10
optimal outcomes as Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria, and that satis￿es some fairness
properties, in particular two new axioms of Merit in Preserved Forest (called d-MPF and
S-MPF). Outcomes are individually rational (IR) and the scheme does take into account
environmental responsibility in the sense of our two axioms d-MPF and S-MPF. However,
envy freeness, even in a weak form adapted to the deforestation problem, turns out to be 15
hard to achieve without dropping the other properties.
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11 Introduction
20
The problem of deforestation has several dimensions. One of them takes on the appearance of
negative externalities from forest-rich countries to the entire planet, affecting social ef￿ciency.
Our goal in this paper is to imagine a solution to this externality aspect of the question, while
taking into account of some particular equity issues that arise in this context.
Deforestation in tropical countries accounts for up to 20% of global emissions of CO2. It is 25
the second most important source of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the world and the ￿rst one
in developing countries. It is also a leading cause of loss of global biodiversity. A new scheme
called REDD, for Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation of forests, has
been agreed on at the COP16 of the UNFCCC in Cancun in 2010, to reward countries with low
deforestation rates. The general principle is to compensate developing countries that reduce 30
their deforestation with ￿nancial incentives. As far as details are concerned, there is still no
consensus on the way such ￿nancial incentives should be calculated and allocated. The REDD
transfers would be allocated per unit of real reduction of deforestation compared to a reference
level, called the baseline (see for instance Parker et al, 2008). But the level of the baseline is an
open issue. 35
Overall, the theoretical status of the REDD proposal is not entirely clear to us. Implicitly it
looks like a cost-effectiveness tool: how to impose an exogenous limitation, or any limitation,
of deforestation at the lowest cost for ￿nancing countries?
Now imagine that the issue be addressed from a different angle. Let the explicit goal be
Pareto optimality, supplemented by additional criteria of equity and acceptability that seem 40
relevant for an international externality problem like deforestation. Not surprisingly, the REDD
program has no reason to induce a Pareto optimal reduction of deforestation (see FiguiŁres et al,
2010). Could we develop a class of proposals that will make it? We contend this is possible. At
the conceptual level, the challenge is twofold. First, with the goal of Pareto optimality comes the
issue of disclosure of private pieces of information about preferences, i.e. subjective attributes 45
2that are useful to calibrate the proposals but that countries possess and have an interest to hide.
This is the heart of the literature on implementation. The second challenge is to retain, among
the multiple Pareto optimal outcomes, only those that meet desirable principles of equity. There
existsdiversecriteriaforequityandthispaperisnotanargumentforoneofthemintheabsolute.
Our aim is rather to make them explicit, to alter them in way that is relevant here, to draw a 50
picture of their compatibility or incompatibility and, ultimately, to link them with a possible
solution to the externality problem.
We write "solution to the externality problem" rather than "solution to the deforestation
problem" on purpose. For it is clear that other aspects, ignored in this article, are also making
up the issue of deforestation. For instance, monetary transfers should not pay inactivity. They 55
are meant to be the ￿nancial counterpart of viable alternative activities to deforestation, may be
intensive farming techniques, rural development or other local projects. Finding and support-
ing such parallel policies is part of the challenge. Also of crucial importance is the ability (or
lack thereof) of southern countries to enforce measures or policies against deforestation. Some
experts warn that most of the recipient countries for REDD are too fragile, facing institutional 60
instability and even pervasive corruption. Therefore it would be an error to incentivize them
(Karsenty & Ongolo, 2011). They rightly argue that consolidating these states, expanding the
coverage of property rights and justice, are necessary steps. But these steps are not suf￿cient,
unless one believes heroically that those efforts will end up in states not only strong enough to
enforce local decisions, but also willing to internalize externalities worldwide. Put differently, 65
as the title of the paper also underlines, we do not defend our analysis as a panacea but hope-
fully as a useful step, among others, in the way of a global and applicable knowledge to the
deforestation issue.
In doing so, this paper also offers two by-products. Firstly, it contributes to the mecha-
nism design literature by broadening the scope of the so-called "compensation mechanisms" 70
(Danziger & Schnytzer, 1991, Varian, 1994). So far, compensation mechanisms apply to situa-
tions of positive externalities, under the guise of adequately designed subsidies, or to situations
3of negative externalities, with the use of particular taxes. But deforestation is a negative ex-
ternality problem for which taxation is not possible, due to the lack of an international body
with the power to impose it. We can shrewdly get around this problem by subsidizing avoided 75
deforestation rather than taxing net deforestation (more explanations in Section 3). Secondly,
by introducing two new axioms of environmental responsibility in order to discriminate Pareto
optima in a second best framework, the paper modestly contributes to the economic literature
on equity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we propose a simple static idealization of 80
the North-South Deforestation problem. Section 3 introduces a class of incentive mechanisms
- let us call it REDD* - directly inspired from the compensation mechanisms, and analyses
its ef￿ciency, under different assumptions regarding the structure of information possessed by
countries. Section 4 addresses the crucial questions of acceptability and equity of REDD*. It
proposes two complementary notions of environmental responsibility, and suggests a possible 85
formula for baselines that comply with those notions. Section 5 concludes.
2 A north-south deforestation framework
Consider m countries in the developing South with a high endowment of tropical forests. Defor-




be the number of deforested
hectares by country i, where ￿ di is its total forest area. 90
Each country has a continuous increasing and concave technology that transforms defor-
estation into an index of composite economic goods and/or services1 si (di): This index then
provides utility ui (di) ￿ vi (si (di)) to country i: If it helps, one could think of vi (:) as a linear
transformation of the services derived from deforestation, i.e. vi (si) = ￿i si where ￿i ￿ 0 is
a preference parameter. The functions ui (:) = vi ￿ si (:) are assumed increasing and concave, 95




i ￿ 0 ￿ u0
i:
Also, each country is endowed with an exogenous wealth yi.
Country i’s preferences are de￿ned over the pairs (di;yi), and represented by an additively
separable total utility function:
U
i(di;y
i) = ui (di) + y
i; i = 1;:::;m:
As regards deforestation there is a country-speci￿c limit dbau
i , beyond which nature cannot be
turned into arable lands within the time-scale captured by our static model; or put differently,
for geographical, biophysical or economic reasons the marginal utility of deforestation is zero 100
beyond those thresholds, u0
i (di) = 0; 8 di ￿ dbau
i . Therefore, on a non cooperative basis,
southern countries push deforestation up to that threshold dbau
i :
The north is a block that will be treated as a single country. It is also endowed with an





it is linked with carbon emissions. Its preferences are captured by a utility function:
U
n(D;y
n) = un (D) + y
n;
which is strictly concave and decreasing with respect to the ￿rst argument, u00
n < 0; u0
n ￿ 0:
This model is simple, yet it accounts for the asymmetric nature of the deforestation prob-
lem: at the business-as-usual, deforestation in the South fails to take into account of the negative
externality it generates. Pareto optimal deforestation levels, denoted (d￿
1;:::;d￿
m), on the con-
trary, do not neglect those external effects. Discarding the possibilities of corner allocations for
wealths, optimal issues equalize the marginal bene￿t for the south with the marginal cost for






n ; i = 1;:::;m: (1)
Pareto optimality calls for different, actually lower, deforestation levels d￿
i ￿ dbau
i , because
of their external negative effects2. But avoided deforestation represents an opportunity cost for 105
2Pareto optimal levels are lower, as can be deduced from the properties of utility functions in the South. Their
5southern countries.
3 A class of compensation mechanisms to curb deforestation
3.1 The general design
There is a class of mechanisms, generically referred to as "compensation mechanisms", that
rests on the following logic: agents involved in an economic environment with externalities 110
solve the social dilemma by means of cross-subsidies (in case of positive externalities) or cross-
taxes (in case of negative externalities) whose magnitude they decide by themselves. The role
of the regulator, no matter who or what it may be, is simply to give effect to these decisions.
The classic reference is Varian (1994), but important predecessors are Guttman (1978, 1985 and
1987) and Danziger and Schnytzer (1991). These mechanisms implement ￿rst best allocations 115
as subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
That kind of solution cannot be applied as it stands in our context of transnational negative
externalities, because it would involve the developed North taxing the developing South! But a
trick can be found to retain the spirit of the mechanism, while turning taxes into subsidies. The
description of what we call REDD* is as follows. The North can now decide to subsidize devel- 120
oping countries who are willing to reduce their deforestation through a two-stage mechanism:
1. Announcement stage: in this ￿rst stage, countries choose subvention/tax rates simulta-




i is the subsidy rate offered to developing country i; and asks developing country
i to choose a tax rate ts
i. The regulator also imposes that tn
i 2 [0;ts
i]; in other words the 125
span of the set of decisions of the North depends on the decisions taken in the South. It
means that, by construction, the amount of transfers can never exceed what the South has
decided to take from the Norht. As explained in Section 4.1, this ￿rst change in the initial





. And according to (1), at
a Pareto optimal allocation, the marginal utilities in the South are positive.
6mechanism is important to guarantee individual rationality in southern countries. Those
announced rates are collected and end up in the following formula for transfers: condi- 130













i ￿ di) if di < db
i ;
0 otherwise,







i ￿ di) ￿ "i(tn
i ￿ ts
i)2 if di < db
i ; "i > 0;
0 otherwise.
The second change from the initial mechanism comes from the constants db
i;i = 1;:::;m.
These are the baselines, supposedly set by the regulator and through which price regula-
tion obeys a logic of subsidy, not tax. This stage can be interpreted as a negotiation phase 135
where countries discuss the correct price signal of avoided deforestation.
2. Choice stage: in this second stage, each southern country i determines its level of defor-
estation di. Transfers are then implemented.

























i ￿ di) :
Three important remarks about the speci￿cities of this class of mechanisms are in order:
￿ Under Varian’s mechanism, transfers are a linear function of the amount of negative ex- 140
ternality produced. Here transfers are a linear function of (db
i ￿ di). Thereby REDD*
rewards the effort of avoided deforestation of the South as desired by the international
community rather than taxing the net deforestation level.
7￿ Under REDD+, each tropical country willing to reduce its deforestation level below its
reference level would receive a transfer t(db
i￿di) with t being the exogenous carbon price 145
onthemarket. REDD*differsbecausethepricesignaltisdeterminedendogenously.This
will turn out to be important to ensure some attractive properties of the outcome, namely
Pareto optimality (Section 3.2) and individual rationality (Section 4.1).
￿ in the end, the ￿nancing of the schemes does not rely on the carbon market. Hence one of
the channels for the risk of carbon leakage3 is eliminated. 150
3.2 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria
At a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), individual decisions are determined as usual
by backward induction. In the last decision period, developing countries choose their optimal
deforestation level d￿
i which maximizes their utility under the mechanism, knowing tn
i and ts
i:













With the assumptions made so far, u0
i(:) can be inverted, so d￿
i is a function of tn









Applying the implicit function theorem to (2), we can deduce that the larger the subsidy rate,










3Carbon leakage refers to an increase in carbon dioxide emissions in one country as a result of an emissions
reduction by a second country..
8In the ￿rst period, countries choose the tax/subsidy levels. In the South, the ￿rst order









i) = 0; (4)
is satis￿ed, i.e. the best decision ts


































i ) : (6)
It is the product of two terms, the ￿rst one has an ambiguous sign whereas the second one is
negative (see (3)).
At a SPNE, because of (5), necessarily ts
i = tn
i = t. It is quite possible, when the baseline
is too low, that country i’s equilibrium strategy is to reject the mechanism, that is to say not to
tax the north. We postpone the study of this case - which is linked to the important property
of individual rationality - to Section 4.1 and, for the time being, we focus on situations where
the mechanism is not rejected. There are actually two kinds of SPNE, where the North always
chooses the upper bound in its interval of possible decisions [0;ts
i]. Those for which the North
decision is constrained, when u0
n + ts
i < 0: In that case @Un=@tn
i > 0; the marginal gain from
reducing the deforestation is larger than the cost of the incentive to be offered to the South, but
the choice of the tax ts
i by southern country i does not allow to push further the subsidy tn
i . And
there are those for which u0
n + ts
i = 0, in which the upper bound tn
i = ts
i is an unconstrained
corner decision: We will restrict our attention to this last kind of SPNE, that are also Pareto










9This last equation characterizes all the subgame perfect interior nash equilibria. Since an
interior Pareto Optimum requires ￿u0
n = u0
i ; one observes from (7) that it can be reached 155
through the mechanism.
3.3 About the information structure
The solution concept used above to describe non cooperative decisions is indicative of the in-
formation structure under which the mechanism is supposed to work: the "regulator", whatever
it may be, does not have any information about countries’ preferences but countries themselves 160
know a great deal more. They know the utility function of each other; they know that they know
that, and they know that they know that they know that, and so on. In the terminology of game
theory, there is complete information and common knowledge.
The assumption of complete information and common knowledge is sometimes justi￿ed
as an approximation for situations where there exists a suf￿cient degree of familiarity among 165
agents. One may or may not subscribe to the view that this approximation is relevant for the
deforestation problem. But is such an assumption really necessary? Or is it rather a convenience
of presentation, a useful simpli￿cation? Would countries play the predicted Nash equilibrium
under different, less demanding, information structures?
Empirical studies have found that supermodular (when agents best responses are upward 170
sloping) or near-supermodular games exhibit behavior of subjects that converges to the Nash
equilibrium. Super-modularity is a technical property of games that ensures convergence to
equilibrium under various learning dynamics, which include Bayesian learning, ￿ctitious play,
adaptive learning, and Cournot best reply (see Chen and Gazzale, 2004). This ￿nding raises the
important question of whether our class of compensation mechanisms is supermodular in the 175
subsidies?













So the game is super-modular.
10To illustrate, Appendix B considers a case where complete information and common knowl-
edge are ruled out. Countries take myopic decisions on the basis of their private information.
Their interactions de￿nes a sort of repeated international negotiation where countries proceed 180
by tat￿nnement to ￿nd ts
i and tn
i . The important message is that, asymptotically, we get the
same price signal t as before, when countries were supposed to have complete information and
common knowledge. Therefore the ef￿ciency of the mechanism does not necessarily disappears
when countries do not have all the information on each other’s preferences. The proposed class
of mechanisms implement the optimum under less restrictive informational conditions than one 185
may think at ￿rst sight. This property remains whatever the "i and the db
i chosen, allowing
us to choose baselines which satisfy some fairness properties. Various types of baselines are
discussed in the next section.
4 Baselines and equity
An important topic of the international debate about the ￿nancing of avoided deforestation in 190
the South is the de￿nition of the baselines. Several possibilities are under consideration. They
could be based only on historical levels of deforestation but this would promote countries that
have had "bad" past behavior. They could also take into account countries’ development paths
so that countries that have not cleared a lot of their forest until now would be favored. For more
details on possible baseline de￿nitions see Bush et al (2009). What is more likely to happen is 195
a mix of those logics.
In addition, there exists an academic literature that addresses the question of equity from a
more general perspective; it already gives a substantial and well organized bulk of knowledge
(see for instance Roemer, 1998, Fleurbaey, 2008, or Clement et al, 2010) and we will borrow
three important notions from it: individual rationality, no-envy and responsibility. 200
Thissectionpresentsaseriesofroundtripsbetweentheacademicliteratureandtheconcerns
currently expressed about the design of REDD. Equipped with quali￿ed axioms that seem rele-
vant for the deforestation problem, it is possible to suggest different formulas for baselines. The
11investigation will keep in mind the asymmetric nature of information. Thus, baselines should
be designed without the recourse to pieces of information about utility functions not supposed 205
to be publicly available.
4.1 Individual rationality
For international issues without a supranational authority, cooperation is problematic if the
contemplatedsolutiondoesnotguarantyeachcountryalevelofnationalwelfareatleastequalto
that they enjoyed under the business-as-usual scenario. The idea is already present in Steinhaus 210
(1948) and is sometimes called the fair share guaranteed criterion. Pareto optimal allocations
that are individually rational prevent such kind of objections and can be viewed not only has an
equity criterion but also, on more practical grounds, as a minimal condition for acceptability.
Axiom 4.1 (IR). A Pareto optimal allocation (d￿
1;:::;d￿







































It will prove useful to break this requirement into two pieces, an individual rationality in the
South when the ￿rst m inequalities hold, and an individual rationality in the North when the last 215
inequality holds.
If all relevant pieces information about utility functions were available, setting baselines
while respecting IR would simply amount to solve the system of linear inequalities (8) and
(9). As explained in Appendix C, there exists, for each developing country, a set of accept-






baseline is chosen in this neighborhood, then this country does not reject the Pareto optimal
12allocation. Ignoring informational constraints the set of acceptable baselines for each country





























i ; i = 1;:::;m:







































































But our informational conditions are unfortunately quite hard. To compute the lower bound
of Bi (:) and the upper bound of Bn (:), one needs private pieces of information about countries’
preferences. Yet, there clearly exists a vector of possible baselines that is common to all those






. Let us emphasize this possibility: 220
Proposition 4.1. Consider a Pareto optimal allocation. It is accepted worldwide as a REDD*
outcome when db
i = dbau
i ;8i = 1;:::;m:
It is worth noting that introducing the mechanism cannot be harmful for southern coun-
tries. Consider for instance a southern country. It could unilaterally secure the level of util-
ity it enjoyed under the business-as-usual scenario. It suf￿ces to set ts
i = 0: Then, because 225
tn
i 2 [0;ts
i] ; necessarily tn
i = 0 and d￿
i (tn
i ) = d￿
i (0) = dbau
i while yi￿ = yi
0: If countries uni-
laterally settle for equilibrium tax rates that are not zero, ts￿








0 ; i = 1;:::;m: In other words, southern countries can unilaterally
escape the mechanism. So whether or not the mechanism change behavior, IR is guaranteed in
the south. In this perspective, the choice of baselines is an issue, not to ensure IR in the South 230
but to avoid rejection of the mechanism and to obtain IR in the North.
13The above proposition identi￿es a suf￿cient condition, db
i = dbau
i ;8i = 1;:::;m, to impose
on baselines in order to ensure individual rationality of a REDD* outcome to all countries, the
North included. Let us insist that it does not necessarily mean that if baselines are larger or
lower than the BAU levels, IR is violated. By inspection of Appendix C, we can even say that 235
the stronger the concavity of utility functions, the more we may set baselines that depart from
BAU levels. But, clearly, being too lax on baselines has the effect of increasing the volume of
transfers, at the risk of transgressing individual rationality of the north. And being too strict




income bundle of another country4. This concept plays an important role in the economic analy-
sis of equity (for seminal contributions, see Tinbergen, 1946, Foley, 1967, Kolm, 1971, Varian,
1974). It has often been discussed and criticized on several counts. It is well understood that no-
envy is hard to achieve when agents have different and non transferable talents. And the ethical 245
relevance of the notion has also been questioned. If envy can be considered a nasty feeling, why
should it be used to elaborate a re￿ection on equity? Some argue however that no-envy may
be proposed as a guide of justice in so far as it is indicative of social peace and, presumably,
stability of the proposed state of affairs. Because of those kinds of objections and subtleties,
many re￿nements or weakening of the no-envy criterion have been proposed, and we are no 250
exception. In the deforestation context we shall introduce in this section three quali￿cations to
the no-envy test.
First, because of the asymmetry between developed and developing countries, it makes
4Envy is a social sentiment that is captured in a very particular way in much of the economic literature. We
follow that tradition in this paper, but we refer to Kolm (1995) for an insightful discussion of the issue, and where
envy is modelled as a negative consumption externality.






















The above notion could still be criticized in our context, for it does not question the domain
over which it is reasonable to use the absence of envy as a guide for equity. Should the domain
incorporates the exogenous incomes yi
0? Those variables can be so dramatically different from 255
one developing country to another for reasons of size, history, geography... Although the issue
of justice along the dimension of incomes could be developed at length, one can admit that
redressing a feeling of envy grounded on income inequalities is far beyond the scope of REDD
transfers. This seems at best a welcome consequence of those transfers, at worst a requirement
not very realistic. 260
So the second re￿nement we propose is to discard from the domain of justice the exogenous
endowments of incomes. A modi￿ed and weaker condition of no-envy would then focus only
























































A last re￿nement is in order. Clearly, small countries may not be able to achieve the same
level of services derived from deforestation as those enjoyed by larger countries, for two rea-
sons. It might be because their forest endowment is (relatively) too small, or because their
technology to transform deforestation into services is (relatively) less ef￿cient5. Formally, for
5By way of illustration, in 2005 the forest area of Solomon Islands was 18,770 km2 (56th rank in the world),
to be compared with the 366,020 km2 (15th in the world) for Argentina, or with the 4,502,770 km2 (1st rank) of
Brazil. Source: FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005: Progress Towards Sustainable Forest Management
(Forestry Paper 147, Rome 2006).






enjoyed by country j, there might be no admissible
value of deforestation in country i that would allow to achieve that level:
si (di) < s
￿





Then, how could country i has a claim against a particular allocation that would allow another
country j a level of deforestation, and the corresponding services, which are beyond reach for
country i? Their respective situations are not commutable, for physical and/or technical reasons.





that si (di) = s￿
j; de￿ne the function that measures the number of deforested hectares in country
i that are necessary to produce the same level of service that country j enjoys when it uses dj
di = gij (dj) ; gij (:) ￿ s
￿1
i ￿ sj (:): (11)
Finally, on that basis, a modi￿ed test for no-envy could be:
Axiom 4.2 (NRES). There is no restricted envy in the South (NRES) if there exists no pair of






























In the particular case where countries have the same technologies and differs only with
respect to their endowments of forests, then s
￿1


























If forest endowments are too different, so that inequality (10) holds, then the NRES test is 265
somewhat satis￿ed by default.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the set of acceptable baselines worldwide, BIR; encompasses
vectors of identical baselines for all southern countries. Whatever the differences in forest en-
dowments, aParetooptimalallocationimplementedviatheREDD*mechanismwherecountries
are offered the same baselines, db
i = db;8i; satis￿es NRES and IR. 270









; then the NRES test for such



















































Now, because t￿ = u0
i (di



























an inequality that is veri￿ed because the functions ui (:) are concave.
The above proposition leaves open the question of the existence of a Pareto optimal alloca-
tion sustained by the mechanism when baselines are identical. Proposition 4.2 just states that, if
such an outcome exists, then it satis￿es NRES (and IR by construction). But we know from the
previous section that there is a risk that countries reject the mechanism, unless their baselines 275
is identical to their BAU. Actually, the dif￿culty is whether the set BIR of acceptable baselines
de￿ned in the previous section contains a common baseline. If all countries had very similar
dbau






m would do the job. But more realistically, countries
have very different dbau
i , and setting identical baselines may lead countries to fall back to the
BAU scenario rather than to avoid envy. 280
4.3 Responsibility in deforestation
Getting back to propositions currently discussed at the UN, there is a concern that, based on
observed current deforestation behaviors, countries have varying degrees of merit or account-
ability to the environment problem and, therefore, should be subject to differential treatments,
particularly as far as baselines are concerned. 285
Until recently, the theme of responsibility was seldom analyzed in the economic academic
literature (for a recent review see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011). Much of the ethics of re-
sponsibility rests on the premise that agents have full control over some variables, and therefore
17should bear the consequence of the exercise of their control, without interference from society,
whereas they should be compensated for the adverse in￿uence of characteristics beyond their 290
control (like handicaps for individuals)6.
4.3.1 A measure of merit in avoided deforestation
In this section, this dichotomy between controlled and uncontrolled variables, serves as inspira-
tion to develop an analysis of how baselines can be adjusted according to the responsibility of
countries7. But instead of addressing the issue in terms of countries’ responsibility in creating 295
the deforestation problem we prefer a more positive tone, where countries are considered in
terms of their merit relating to avoided deforestation. The ￿rst task is to give a precise content
to the term "merit" that is used here.
The dif￿culty is that observable decisions taken in the past by developing countries have re-
sultedfromamixtureofcontrolledanduncontrolledfactors.Countriesdohavedifferentcharac- 300
teristics, more or less beyond their control, like their natural land endowments and geoclimatic
conditions. On the other hand, countries’ preferences are usually considered sovereign. And,
with regard to this question of responsibility, the status of their "technology" si(:) that trans-
6Not surprisingly, drawing a separating line between agents’ characteristics that fall into the responsibility
sphere and those that do not, is no easy thing. Assuming this can be done in a satisfactorily way, two main ethical
principles have been studied. First, the compensation principle requires that some transfers be organized to neu-
tralize the in￿uence of factors that are not under the agents’ responsibility. Second, according to the natural reward
principle differences that are due to the exercice of variables under control should be respected.
7This existing literature on responsibility and compensation did not seem directly applicable to our subject for
at least two reasons. Firstly, much of it is about pure redistribution problems, in microeconomic environments
without externalities among agents. Our context, by contrast, is akin to a production environment - by turning to
cooperation, countries "produce" a social surplus - with unilateral externalities (from the South to the North). Sec-
ondly, many analysis of responsibility are developed in a ￿rst-best context: all the necessary pieces of information
required to draw the consequences of responsibility are supposed available, an assumption we have ruled out in
the ￿rst place. Put differently, the deforestation problem has a special structure that raises speci￿c moral issues and
constraints.
18forms deforestation into services is unclear. One may argue that current technologies re￿ects
past choices, but this might be correct only to some extent. And even if countries cannot be 305
considered responsible for their available technology, si(:) might be dif￿cult and/or costly to
observe. We will consider the two possible cases, where si(:) falls inside or outside the set of
controlled factors.
A possible measure of merit could be the gap between the total possible deforestation and
the BAU deforestation, ￿ di￿dbau
i ; that is, the contribution on a voluntary basis to pristine nature.
However such a measure would attribute the same merit to countries with the same gap but with
large differences in potential contributions, because some countries have much larger ￿ di than
others, a feature that we chose to regard as outside the sphere of responsibility. This objection
is overcome if the merit is measured in relative terms, with the ratio:
Mi =




A further re￿nement of this measure is possible if the technologies si(:) are observable and
considered outside the scope of responsibility. A country might have a comparatively large
BAU not because its preferences command to deforest heavily, but because it is endowed with
a poor technology. How to neutralize the effect of technology on past choices, while preserving












as the level of deforestation required to enjoy the service si(dbau
i ) if country i were endowed
with the technology of the most ef￿cient developing country. Recall the de￿nition of function
ghi (d) introduced by (11) in Section 4.2: it indicates the number of deforested hectares that are
necessary, under country h0 s technology, to produce the same level of service that country i
enjoys when it uses d and its own technology: If country i has the most ef￿cient technology,
then e dbau
i = dbau
i : But in general e dbau
i ￿ dbau
i : Then the numbers
Mi =




would enjoy the most ef￿cient technology. Differences in those ratios re￿ect only differences 310
in preferences, not in a mixture of preferences and technologies.
Whichever way we measure the Mis, let us note M = (1=n)
P
i Mi the average ratio
of merit and de￿ne ￿Mi = Mi ￿ M. From the point of view of their contributions to the
environment, countries can be partitioned into two subsets, those that are deserving (￿Mi > 0)
and those that are not (￿Mi ￿ 0). 315
4.3.2 Two axioms for merit in preserved forest
Two possible requirements on transfers can be formulated, where each recognizes, in a particu-
lar way, the heterogenous role played in the past by countries on the deforestation problem.
Axiom 4.3 (d-MPF). Let d be a reference vector of deforestation levels. A transfer scheme sat-
is￿es "d - Merit in Preserved Forest" (d-MPF) if the baselines offered to "deserving" countries 320
are at least equal to their deforestation level di indicated in d, whereas the baselines offered to
"undeserving" countries are at most equal to di.
The above requirement is a priori silent about the reference vector for baselines, but a
natural candidate would grant each country its BAU level. This is the possibility carrying more
weight currently; more precisely, the suggestion under scrutiny is to set up baselines on the 325
basis of the average of historical national levels observed over a time period (usually 10 years)8.
In a way, this suggestion assumes some libertarian perspectives (Nozick, 1974), according to
which past practices are all vested rights. In addition, we saw in Section 4.1 that when baselines
are exactly equal to BAU levels, IR is satis￿ed worldwide.
Axiom 4.4 (S-MPF). A transfer scheme satis￿es "Sensitivity with respect to Merit in Preserved 330
Forest" (S-MPF) if the baseline to country i is an increasing function of its departure from the
average ratio of merit, ￿Mi.
8It is related to BAU levels if one believes that past behaviors are acceptable predictors for future behaviors.
20Note that S-MPF could admit a more demanding form, by imposing that the baseline offered
to country i be a strictly increasing - instead of simply increasing - function of ￿Mi:
The two axioms can add up to embody the more general requirement to conceive baselines 335
as deviations around a reference vector (for example the BAU), where the sign and the extent
of the deviation by a particular country depends on its measure of environmental merit.
4.3.3 The d-MPF / NRES tension
If baselines comply with d-MPF they generally propose a differential treatment to different
countries, unless all the coordinates in d are identical. By contrast, offering identical baselines 340
to all countries can avoid restricted envy in the South. Notice however that identical baselines
are suf￿cient but not necessary to entail NRES. In general, no envy is closely related, though
not identical, to equality. By and large, intuition suggests there is a dif￿culty to combine NRES
and d-MPF, but could this tension be ascertained? At least, this can indeed be proven when the
reference deforestation vector d is given by the BAU. 345
Theorem 4.5. Any transfer scheme that satis￿es d-MPF where d is ￿xed at the BAU, d = dbau ,
does not respect NRES when countries are suf￿ciently heterogenous.
Proof. Appendix D.
So, the goal of avoiding envy leads not only to disregard individual rationality, as we saw in
section 4.2, but also to overlook a form of environmental responsibility. 350
4.3.4 Possible formulas for baselines
Cooperation produces a surplus of well-being. In a ￿rst best informational setting, it would be
natural to set baselines in order to redistribute at least part of this surplus to the South. But this
is not the path we take in our hidden information setting. Our ambition is simply to discriminate
countries according to their environmental merit, and the redistribution of welfare will be only 355
an indirect consequence of this discrimination.
21One can design a family of baselines that comply with the two axioms dbau-MPF and S-
MPF, and IR as well. The idea is to offer a bonus (resp. a malus) for deserving (undeserving)












i ; ￿i ￿ 0: (12)
The bonus (resp. malus) is the total contribution to the environment by countries multiplied
by country i’s ratio of merit. One can see the expression ￿Mi
Pm
h=1




contribution to the environment for which it can be considered responsible since some correc-
tions have been made to discard uncontrolled factors. The coef￿cients ￿i are used to adjust the
weight of the bonus in relation to that of the BAU. By construction, such a family of baselines
complies with dbau-MPF and S-MPF, and there exists "small" coef￿cients ￿i such that IR and
ef￿ciency obtain. Note also that if ￿i = ￿; 8i; then IR in the North is respected, even for a




























an equality that implies IR in the North (Proposition 4.1). 360
In practice, one can consider using this formula in a repeated ￿trial and error￿ process where
baselines are ￿rst set at the BAU levels (with ￿i = 0), and then parameters ￿i are progressively
increased in orderto meet theaxioms dbau-MPF andS-MPF and up tothe point where aproblem
occurs, i.e. one or several southern countries reject the mechanism. A fall back to the previous
parameter values is then desirable. 365
One must keep in mind, however, that a transfer scheme REDD* where baselines are given
by (12) satis￿es dbau-MPF and, therefore, may violate NRES if countries are too different (The-
orem 4.5).
225 Summary
This article proposes a class of incentive mechanisms, called REDD*, to curb deforestation 370
ef￿ciently in tropical countries. It is derived from the class of compensation mechanisms and
adapted to the context of international negative externalities where the possibility to tax coun-
tries is discarded. In summary, the proposed class of mechanisms allows one to choose some
combinations of fairness axioms - individual rationality (IR), a form of no-envy (NRES), and
two new axioms of environmental responsibility (d-MPF and/or S-MPF) - without losing Pareto 375
optimality.
A ￿rst interesting conclusion is that IR, d-MPF and I-MPF can be compatible. There is no
unavoidable and extreme trade-off between acceptability and environmental responsibility. Ul-
timately, such an arrangement could allay the fears of those who, perhaps rightly, warn that
setting baselines equal to the business-as-usual produces perverse incentives overtime: "If I 380
deforest more today, tomorrow my payments will automatically be greater". But as soon as
baselines also depend on the environmental responsibility, such a calculation is no longer nec-
essarily true. Less deforestation today will produce, ceteris paribus, a premium for tomorrow
and may trigger a virtuous circle.
A tension exists however between no-envy and IR, and between no-envy and recognition 385
of responsibility in deforestation. The ￿rst requirement tends to favor equal baselines for all,
whereas the other two requirements calls for different baselines. Future research could explore
more deeply the reasonable compromises between these two requirements.
Finally it is worth noting that a part of our proposal could, in principle, be used for other
problems of international negative externalities - like pollution or global warming - where tax- 390
ation is not possible and where IR is a minimal condition for acceptability.
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A Pareto optimal allocations 435
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26In the sequel we focus on Pareto optimal allocations that involve strictly positive values for
yi;i = 1;:::;m and yn. Hence, conditions (14) and (17) must be satis￿ed as equalities. Then,
from the resulting equations:
￿i = 1; i = 1;:::;m:






as indicated in the text by expression (1).
B A myopic adjustment process
Rule out complete information and common knowledge. Imagine that countries do not know
each others’ preferences; assume they are myopic and, at each announcement stage, they pro-
ceed by tat￿nnement to ￿nd ts
i and tn
i . This kind of process could correspond to an international
repeated negotiation, where, at each period, each and every country i in the South and the North




















with ￿ > 0 a parameter: 440
Along this myopic process, a southern country will match its level of transfer at t + 1 with
the one from the North at t. And the north will adjust its chosen level of transfer, if it sees that
there is a marginal gain (respectively loss) from increasing (resp. decreasing) Dt. Then it will
decrease (resp. increase) tn
i proportionally.
Proposition B.1. Assume that countries do not know each others’ preferences and that each 445
and every country behaves myopically as de￿ned by the above adjustment process (19). Then if
the mechanism is repeated over time, it converges asymptotically to a Pareto Optimum.

























































ti;t+1 = Ati;t + b (21)
As one can check, a steady state, where tn
i;t+1 = tn
i;t, is Pareto optimal. Indeed:












infer the stability of the stationary states by studying the transition matrix A. The eigenvalues,
￿1 and ￿2; of matrix A solve P(￿) = ￿ ￿ ￿
2 + ￿Un
2 = 0. If ￿ <
Un
2
4 , the shape of P is 450
presented in ￿gure 1. So (￿1;￿2) 2]0;1[￿]0;1[ and consequently a (Pareto optimal) steady
state is asymptotically stable.





























i) = t￿ at a Pareto optimal allocation which is implemented via the mechanism,






















Because of concavity, when db
i ￿ dbau
i , the above inequality is guaranteed. By continuity, clearly
there also exists a threshold lower bound baseline d
b
i ￿ dbau
i for which this condition continues











































i . To sum up, when the price signal is u0
i (d￿
i) = t￿, and because of








































D Tension between dbau-MPF and NRES














































































































































But the last term of the inequality (23) is necessarily negative for some countries and may com-
promise the test for no-envy. Assume, without loss of generality, that country j is "deserving"











Assume also that dbau
i < dbau











































































Now because the values dbau
i and dbau





















































































in violation of NRES. QED.
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